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Following 40 years of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran, how 
does Indonesia view Iran then and now? Is the exportation of the 
Revolution now relevant amid the contemporary political 
constellation in the Middle East and the world? Does Shia Islam 
remain to pose a sociopolitical problem today in the largest Muslim 
nation? In view of the current political standoff with the United 
States of America, will the system, based on Velayat-e Fagheh 
(Guardianship of the Jurist), remain strong against all odds? This 
article explores these questions based on personal reflections, 
experiential learning and continuous engagement in and with Iran. 
[Setelah 40 tahun Revolusi Islam pimpinan Khomeini berhasil 
memukau dunia, menarik untuk melihat pandangan Indonesia 
terhadap Iran, yang dulu dan sekarang. Apakah semangat revolusi 
masih relevan terkait dengan konstelasi politik Timur Tengah dan 
dunia kontemporer? Apakah persoalan Syiah masih dipandang 
sebagai pemicu berbagai problema sosio-politik di Indonesia? 
Melihat permusuhan Amerika terhadap Iran, apakah sistem Velayat-
e Fagheh (Kepemimpinan oleh Faqih) masih relevan menghadapi 
berbagai tantangan yang dihadapi Iran saat ini? Artikel ini berupaya 
mengeksplorasi pertanyaan-pertanyaan di atas berdasar refleksi dan 
pengalaman personal serta pengamatan terhadap situasi 
perkembangan di Republik Islam Iran.] 
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Introduction 
The year 2019 marks the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution 
of Iran. When the 1978/1979 revolution exploded, the world for the most 
part was dumbstruck. The attitude of the unsuspecting West was 
subsequently followed by the usual condescension and sarcasm. Many 
predicted that the Revolution, led by Ayatullah Rohullah Khomeini with 
his medieval exterior look and seemingly archaic political system, could 
not possibly stand the test of time. However, the mullahs have evidently 
proved the world wrong, over and over again. 
On July 3, 2017, US President Donald Trump’s recently appointed 
National Security Adviser John Bolton in a “Free Iran Gathering” in 
Paris was convinced of Iran’s imminent collapse and the need for 
“regime change”. “The outcome of the president’s [Trump’s] policy 
review should be to determine that the Ayatullah Khomeini’s 1979 
revolution will not last until its 40th birthday,” Bolton said.1 He even 
hinted at celebrating Christmas in Tehran. Wrong again! 
Such has been the default attitude of many hawkish US 
administration high-ranking officials for over four decades. Successive US 
presidents, from both the Republican and Democratic Parties, from 
Jimmy Carter to Trump have constantly proven to misjudge Iran’s resolve 
and determination. George W. Bush’s labeling of Iran as part of the “axis 
of evil” was also unhelpful, despite Iran’s incessant ‘war’ against Al-
Qaidah, Daish (Al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fii al-Iraq wa al-Sham), An-Nusrah 
and the likes of the Sunni jihadi terror links.2 
Only president Barack Obama seemed to have given the Iranian 
government the benefit of the doubt with the nuclear deal—officially 
called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action)—, which was signed in 
2015 and then subsequently annulled by Trump. With the current political 
standoff with the US and the talk of war, it is imperative that the US 
                                                          
1 See: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/freeiran2017/23114-john-bolton-iran-regime-
must-not-reach-40th-birthday (accessed on August 7, 2018). 
2 Bush had categorized Iran as an axis of evil together with Kim Jong Il’s North Korea 
and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
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administration does not commit to the same folly, as was the case in Iraq, 
Libya and Syria. A recent statement dated May 24, 2019 by the American 
College of National Security Leaders, comprising retired admirals, 
generals, ambassadors and other statesmen warned of the impending 
mistake if Trump chooses to wage war on Iran.3 The statement, which is 
directed to President Trump, states: 
 
The mutual animosity between the United States and Iran, the 
accelerated deployment of an aircraft carrier strike group and B-52 
bombers to the region, and reports of Iranian preparations for attacks 
on U.S. military and diplomatic facilities are highly concerning and make 
for a potentially deadly confrontation. A war with Iran, either by choice 
or miscalculation, would produce dramatic repercussions in an already 
destabilized Middle East and drag the United States into another armed 
conflict at immense financial, human, and geopolitical cost.4 
 
The statement further calls on Trump as follows: 
 
As President and Commander-in-Chief, you have considerable power at 
your disposal to immediately reduce the dangerous levels of regional 
tension.   Crisis de-escalation measures should be established with the 
Iranian leadership at the senior levels of government as a prelude to 
exploratory diplomacy on matters of mutual concern.  The protection 
of U.S. national interests in the Middle East and the safety of our friends 
and allies require thoughtful statesmanship and aggressive diplomacy 
rather than unnecessary armed conflict.5 
 
From the statement, it is clear that American military leaders are fed 
up with the seemingly relentless and costly war in the Middle East. Any 
unnecessary wars in the Middle East could quite possibly create further 
                                                          
3 https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/an-open-letter-to-president-donald-trump-on-
u-s-tensions-with-iran/ (accessed on May 25, 2019). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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polarization in the American society and alienate the Trump presidency 
more than it already has now. 
 
Islamic Revolution and Southeast Asia 
For the vast majority of Iranians, the Revolution represents the 
triumph of Islam over absolute monarchy led by Shahanshah (King of 
Kings) Mohamed Reza Pahlevi, who was adamantly backed by the US and 
its powerful Western allies. Not long after the return from exile of Imam 
Khomeini to his homeland in February 1979, Iran observers quickly 
realized that the mullahs were here to stay, and that they were not 
pushovers. 
In fact, the hardline Students Following the Lines of Imam 
Khomeini gate crashed the US Embassy in Tehran, took it over, and held 
it hostage for 444 days along with American diplomats and staff members. 
Since then, diplomatic ties between the two governments have never 
recovered, until today. 
During the tumultuous period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations were busying themselves 
with economic development and “structural adjustment” programs 
imposed upon them to comply with Western financial standards and 
monetary systems. This was to ensure and secure foreign direct 
investments in the region. As a result, many Southeast Asian countries was 
engulfed in what Kunio Yoshihara called “Ersatz Capitalism”,6 which was 
brought and bred by the region’s authoritarian governments and 
strongmen of the likes of Suharto in Indonesia, Mahathir Mohamed in 
Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and Ferdinand Marcos in the 
Philippines.7 
Given such context, these governments obviously did not want the 
exportation of Khomeini’s Revolution to hold sway among the large swath 
                                                          
6 Kunio Yoshihara, The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia, Oxford University Press, 
Singapore, 1988. 
7 While, these post-colonial states were unambiguously under the sway and influence of 
Western Capitalism, Indo-China states such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR were 
very much under the USSR (now, Russia) and Chinese spheres of influence. 
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of Muslim populations in their respective countries. If so, such a political 
scenario would have made Western foreign investors nervous, if not 
anxious. What is more, the inherent revolutionary spirit of Shia Islam 
would not at all have been compatible with the economic development 
and modernization project that were taking place rapidly in these 
countries. 
In Indonesia, Suharto’s New Order regime tried to curb the rising 
expectations in the Islamic Revolution by getting the Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI/Indonesian Council of Ulama) to issue a 1984 
recommendation against the Shia teachings and doctrines, which they saw 
as “fundamentally different” from the Sunni strand of Islam as espoused 
by most Indonesian Muslims. The MUI recommendation suggested that 
Indonesian Muslims be “vigilant” toward the negative effects of 
Khomeini’s Shia revolution. I have argued elsewhere that such 
“minoritization” and “criminalization” of Shia Islam stemmed mostly 
from the New Order’s political expediency and religious ignorance, rather 
than any real theological threat on the Muslim populace, given the 
predominantly and massively influential local socio-religious groups such 
as the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah.8 
About the same time and for almost the same reason, Malaysia was 
quick to ban Khomeini’s “exportation” of the Islamic Revolution. 
Mahathir even made sure that the Jabatan Kemajuan Islam se-Malaysia 
(Jakim), the federal religious authority, banned Shia, and censored its 
revolutionary books, magazines and pamphlets. For the Malaysian 
government, Shia Islam posed a threat to the politico-religious 
establishment where race, religion and politics are intricately intertwined. 
It was also seen as a political liability with electoral consequences, 
especially among the more conservative Malay-Muslim constituent, which 
was essentially the electoral base for the previously powerful National 
                                                          
8 See Dicky Sofjan, “Minoritization and Criminalization of Shia Islam in Indonesia”. In 
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Villanova University, Vol.39 (2), 2016. 
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Front and the now fragmented United Malay National Organization 
(UMNO).9 
In spite of these government restrictions and banning, some Muslim 
scholars and students from Southeast Asia made the effort to venture to 
the holy city of Qum in Iran to study.10 Since the Revolution, the status of 
Qum as one of the primary centers of learning for Shias ascended to new 
heights. At the time, hundreds of scholars and students from around the 
world came to study under the tutelage of senior Ayatullahs, and 
subsequently became propagators of Shia Islam back in their respective 
homelands, albeit only a small number of them actually carried the 
revolutionary zeal that Khomeini and his followers had initially intended. 
 
Iran After Khomeini 
My first visit to Iran was in 1992 as a visiting student in the 
International Center for Persian Studies, an institutional affiliate of the 
famed Danesgha-e Tehran (Tehran University), one of the Revolutionary 
centers of gravity that brought down the Shah. At the time, my late father 
was a career diplomat tasked as the Chargé d’Affaires in the Indonesian 
Embassy in Tehran. My late parents lived in Tehran in the tail end of the 
Khomeini era, and happily enjoyed Persian hospitality for six memorable 
years. 
Thus, my early exposure to Iran, Shia Islam and Middle Eastern 
politico-religious landscape began more than 25 years ago, having 
conversations with my own father, who was obviously quite well 
informed, after having met many Iranian and Middle Eastern leaders 
                                                          
9 The more progressive among the Malay-Muslim constituents have now shifted their 
political allegiance to the Alternative Front or “Coalition of the Hopeful”, which won 
the recent 2018 election, which propelled 93-year-old Mahathir back in power as 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister. Just recently, Mahathir has toned down his anti-Shia sentiment 
by calling on Sunni Malaysians to accept Shias as Muslims. See: See: 
https://www.malaysia-today.net/2015/09/15/dr-m-tells-sunnis-to-accept-shias-as-
muslims/ (accessed on December 18, 2018) 
10 Qum holds the Shrine of Fatimah Ma’sumah, the daughter of the revered Musa al-
Kadzim, the seventh Imam, and sister of Ali ar-Ridha, the eighth Imam of the Shia Islam 
spiritual lineage. 
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during his tenure in Tehran. Apart from enjoying the usual koobideh kebab 
and shopping at heavily subsidized prices, my time spent there provided 
me with an opportunity to meet regular Iranians, who harbored various 
ideological leanings and political sentiments. It seemed at the time that 
Iranians either loved Khomeini’s revolution or hated it to the core, 
although the latter seemed much less than the former. It was difficult to 
envisage Iranians, or anyone for that matter, to be neutral about the 
Khomeini’s revolution. 
I also made an extra effort to practice my Farsi by talking to Iranians 
on the streets, shopkeepers, university students and taxi drivers in Tehran, 
both the formal and informal ones. During those days, the formal taxi 
drivers would drive around Peugeot 405 or the nationally-made orange-
colored Paykan cars, while the non-formal ones could be driving anything 
from Mercedes or BMWs to Fiats. One just needed to say, “Mustaqeem, 
Agha!” (Straight ahead, Mister!), and the impromptu taxi driver would 
invite the passenger to join in the crowd of three or four other strangers 
in the car. As one can imagine, such short and spontaneous encounters 
usually stirred the most interesting conversations in Iran. 
Tehran taxi drivers were particularly talkative, and have plenty to say 
about literally anything and everything under the sun. They certainly had 
strong opinions about the revolution and their leadership, and would often 
put you off track in your perception of Iranian politics. As I recall, the taxi 
drivers were very inquisitive about foreigners, curiously asking highly 
sensitive questions about religion, politics and how they felt about the 
regime, the Islamic revolution, even about freedom and democracy. Some 
would even go as far as asking me my religious school of thought (Aya 
shoma Sunni ya Shie hastiid?/Are you Sunni or Shia?), all just within a 10-
minute taxi ride. 
However, anyone familiar with Iranian people and their culture, tarof 
or the practice of sugarcoating talk, could stand in the way of 
understanding the reality and much less the intention of why people say 
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the things they say.11 Hence, tarof was one explanation why the nuclear 
negotiations took so many years to sign, only to be scrapped within a short 
period of time by President Donald Trump, which sent shockwaves to 
Iran and US allies, namely the European counterparts.12 Since then, I have 
always watched developments in Iran and its impact on the Middle 
Eastern hemisphere. Such grounding has helped me tremendously to 
teach a course on Middle Eastern politics in the State Islamic University 
of Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. 
As I was completing my Ph.D. program in 2003, my dissertation 
research took me back to Iran, where I conducted a survey research in 
Tehran, Qum, Qazvin and Esfahan. Predictably, the survey research was 
conducted not long after the 911 terrorist attacks on American soil, which 
hardened the stance on US foreign policymakers against anything 
resembling “Islamic fundamentalism”. And as the war and subsequent 
invasion in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq unfolded, domestic tension 
in Iran was at its pinnacle. To the Iranians and many Muslims around the 
world, including in Indonesia, president Bush’s “war on terror” was 
becoming eerily perceived as a “war on Islam”. 
What is more, during the time I conducted the research in Iran, 
university students across the country were protesting against the 
government for the inexorable economic stagnation and what many had 
thought of as a process of political decay. In response to the volatile 
situation, the Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ali Khamenei and government 
leaders bluntly accused the kharejis (foreigners) behind the wave of 
demonstrations across the country and university campuses. As a foreign 
researcher in Iran, it was obviously a tense and sensitive moment for the 
country. I was duly informed that foreign scholars and researchers were 
probably spied on, and that I had to watch my back. 
                                                          
11 Adam Cameron, “The Artful dodger: Iranian tarof and nuclear negotiations”. In The 
Guardian (November 20, 2014). See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-
blog/2014/nov/20/-sp-iran-nuclear-negotiations-tarof (accessed on April 2, 2018) 
12 For a good chronology of events pertaining to the nuclear deal with Iran, see: 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran 
(accessed on March 10, 2019). 
 32|Dicky Sofjan – Forty Years After the Islamic Revolution of Iran 
 
Mesmerizing Persian Intellectual Tradition 
Notwithstanding the incessant diplomatic spats with the US and the 
resulting isolation from the international community (read: mostly North 
American and Western European countries), Iran was able to attract 
students and scholars from different corners of the world to study in the 
country with all expenses paid for by government scholarships or by the 
network of Husseiniyahs or Islamic Shia theological seminaries. 
Surprisingly, interest in studying in Iran came not only from Muslims, but 
also non-Muslims. The choice of subjects was also wide open. Some 
studied ‘secular’ subjects such as Persian Literature, Architecture, 
International Relations, Political Science and Engineering, while the 
religiously-oriented scholars and students understandably opted to do 
their stint in the numerous theological seminaries in Qum. 
Since the revolution, Indonesians have been mesmerized by Iranian 
Shia scholars and ideologues of the Islamic revolution, namely Murtadha 
Mutahhari, Ali Syariati, Thabathaba’i, Khomeini and a whole host of other 
giant historical figures in literature such as Sa’adi, Hafez and Rumi. Not 
long, Indonesia was inundated by translated books on Shia Islam, the 
revolution, ‘irfan (gnosticism), Velayat-e Fagheh (Guardianship of the 
Jurist)—Iran’s political ideology and system in absence of the ‘hidden’ 
Imam named Mahdi al-Muntazhar (the Awaited One). Seizing the 
opportunity, while wanting to earn extra cash to pay for my college 
education, I jumped on the bandwagon, and translated two books of 
Mutahhari into Bahasa Indonesia for Mizan, which was and probably still 
is Indonesia’s most bona fide Islamic publisher.13 
One of the foremost reasons for Indonesian Muslims’ enchantment 
toward Iran is its deep and long intellectual tradition, which Shia scholars 
have successfully maintained and developed over the centuries. Many of 
the books published and translated from Iran have brought many fresh 
                                                          
13 Since its establishment in the 1980s, Mizan has always been perceived to be a Shia 
publishing house, although it also produces numerous other non-specific Shia books on 
Sufism, Islamic philosophy, education, etc. 
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ideas and perspectives in the fields of theology, philosophy, theosophy, 
‘irfan (mysticism), literature, politics and ethics. 
In 2012, I was invited to speak in an international conference 
entitled Akhlaak-e va Adyan (Ethics and Religions) in Qum, along with 
ethicists from around 10 countries, including the US. The conference, 
hosted by Bonyad-e Esra (Esra Foundation), headed by the influential 
Ayatullah Javadi Amuli, a former Imam of the Friday prayer in Qum. The 
spirit of the conference seemed to emphasize the need to rationalize and 
universalize ethics, while still attempting to link it with Islamic revealed 
knowledge.  
Indeed, the most worrying development, as far as the West is 
concerned, relates to Iran’s scientific advancement on uranium 
enrichment, nuclear technology and its aggressive intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. Once Iran is able to truly combine these three capacities, there is 
every reason for the US, its European allies, Israel and its Arab 
neighboring countries to worry about it. But until today, there is hardly 
any clear proof that Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction, 
which the Americans and Israelis have persistently accused Iran of doing 
for almost two decades now. 
It was within this context that Iranian president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad received the hero’s welcome when he visited Indonesia’s 
capital city of Jakarta, and among others spoke to thousands of faculty 
members and students of the State Islamic University of Syarif 
Hidayatulah in May 2006. The controversial yet popular Ahmedinejad was 
highly instrumental during the early stages of the nuclear standoff between 
Iran and the US. Ahmadinejad had persistently argued that enriching 
uranium was his nation’s “right”. During his tenure, Ahmadinejad had said 
on numerous occasions, including in Indonesia, that while the US had 
dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and effectively 
massacred hundreds of thousands of innocent lives, Iran had never 
engaged in such barbaric acts. 
Meanwhile, Iran contends that access to nuclear technology is 
crucial in order for the country to build nuclear power plants that could 
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produce electricity for the whole country and more. The Supreme Leader 
Ali Khamenei had also issued a fatwa (legal opinion or ruling) dating back 
to the mid-1990s that it was forbidden for Iran to produce weapons of 
mass destruction.14 This is in spite of the fact that the country became a 
victim of chemical and biological weapons during its eight bloody years of 
war with Saddam Hussein, whom the US, its Western allies and virtually 
all Arab neighbors vehemently supported. 
During the 32nd International Conference for the Proximity and 
Unity of the Muslim Nation, held in Tehran in late November 2018, to 
which I attended, the Supreme Leader Khamenei again voiced Iran’s 
resistance against US domination and Western pressure, and advised 
Muslim countries to “return to the rule of Islam and come under the 
authority of Allah because the rule of America and Satan will not benefit 
you.”15 The Rahbar, together with the incumbent President Hassan 
Rouhani, also underlined the treachery of Arab and Muslim nations, which 
sought aggression and destruction in Palestine, Syria and Yemen, while 
forging to normalize relations with Israel. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been argued for sometime that with the political ascendancy 
of Iranian-linked governments and groups across the Middle East, a “Shia 
revival” is unfolding in the region.16 While this may be true of the Middle 
East, the argument seems far-fetched in Southeast Asia. Even for 
Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the region and the world, only 
between 150 and 200 students are studying in Iran at any given time. This 
is a far cry from the thousands of Indonesian scholars and students who 
venture to Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, and way much less than 
                                                          
14 For more reading, see Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji, “Nuclear Fatwa Religion 
and Politics in Iran’s Proliferation Strategy”, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
No.115, September 2011. 
15 https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/11/25/581063/Iran-Leader-Ayatollah-
Khamenei 
16 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How conflicts within Islam will shape the future, W.W. Norton 
and Company, 2006. 
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those who choose to study in the US, Europe and other Western 
countries. 
Despite the rising number of Shia institutions, organizations and 
groups linked to Iran in Indonesia, there is simply not enough critical mass 
in Indonesia and in Southeast Asia to forge ahead with the kind of 
revolutionary zeal that was once a source of concern for many Muslim-
populated countries. The irrational fear and hate mongering against Shia 
Islam—being propagated profusely by mostly Salafi-Wahhabi-Jihadi 
proponents in social media, especially during the height of the Syrian 
war—stems mostly from sheer ignorance among Muslim scholars and 
leaders on the diversity within Islam and the inability to grasp the 
complicated and fragmented Middle Eastern geopolitics. 
There is no doubt that the spirit of the Islamic Revolution of Iran 
remains strong after forty tumultuous years despite international sanction, 
intimidation and isolation. The fact that the mullah government still 
remains in power seems to have proven its survivability amid a hostile 
world and unfriendly neighbors that choose not to give Iran the benefit of 
doubt. For many people in the country and region, Iran’s longevity 
symbolizes the determination and steadfastness of David, who is fighting 
against Goliath. 
While Iran has limited political and economic clout over Indonesia 
or Southeast Asia in general, its main soft power—Shia Islam—still holds 
sway among Muslim intellectuals and those who desire to see less 
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